APEC in 1999
The Effectiveness of APEC in Promoting Regional Economic Cooperation and Supporting the World Multilateral Trading Order
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to
evaluate the likely effectiveness of APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation)
as a means for promoting regional economic cooperation and supporting the world
multilateral trading order. This paper is pursued to answer these following
questions: Is APEC really a means for promoting regional economic cooperation
and supporting the world multilateral trading order? If the answer is yes, then
as a means for promoting regional economic cooperation and supporting the world
multilateral trading order, what are the factors that probably make APEC
effective? If the answer is no then what are the factors that probably prevent
APEC from being effective? The examining of APEC’ s structure and initiatives
with reference to the current political–economic situation in the Asia-Pacific
region can be applied in helping us understand the effectiveness of APEC.
Conceptual Framework
There are two aims in this
context: promoting regional economic cooperation and supporting the World
multilateral trading order (henceforth be known as the same as WTO (World Trade
Organization)). The only one means to these two distinct aims is APEC. Below is
the model that is fit with the conceptual framework of this paper.
Both aims are the APEC’ s
commitment. It is clear since the inaugural ministerial meeting in Canberra in
1989 that APEC’ s objective is to sustain growth and development in the region
and to contribute to the growth of the world economy. The meeting in Singapore
in 1990 established several work projects to foster the habit of cooperation
and to demonstrate the benefits of economic cooperation. APEC ministers in
Singapore issued a declaration underlining their commitment to a completion of
the Uruguay Round as a demonstration of APEC’ s support for a strong, open
multilateral system. The meeting in 1993 in Seattle which elevated the process
of cooperation to the highest level of government put an affirmation of the
importance of an open multilateral trading system and the determination of Asia
Pacific leaders to lead the way in taking concrete steps to produce the
strongest possible outcome from Uruguay Round (Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro
1998: 110). Again in 1994 Bogor Declaration stressed that the targets of free
and open trade and investment in the region within 2010 for industrialized
economies and within 2020 for developing economies were to be achieved in a
GATT consistent manner. To this context, indicators telling us that APEC
supports WTO are such as non-discriminatory trading arrangement, positive or no
impact on non-member countries, reduction of trade barrier, elimination on tariff
and non-tariff, unconditional principle of most-favored-nations and process of
liberalization (Sassoon 1997).
Factors that make APEC effective
The conformity between the
principle and APEC’ s nature structure
APEC offers a new model of regional
integration, quite different from the models of the European Union and the
North American Free Trade Agreement. As agreed at its inaugural meeting in
1989, APEC is expected to be a more flexible and outward-looking regional
forum, suited to the realities of Asia and the Pacific, which can be described
as an “open economic association.” An OEA is (Drysdale and Elek 1997: 43-44)
- open in
that its structure and policies do not lead to discrimination against trade and
investment with nonmembers.
- economic
in its primary policy focus on maintaining the high-growth performance of the
region
- a
voluntary association in that its members do not cede powers of regulation or
enforcement to any supranational regional institution.
The OEA is in compliance with the
unique nature of APEC. The unique nature of APEC is not only the differences
between APEC’ s members in term of economic level but also the differing
political concept. The Anglo-American nations- the US, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand- embrace the concept of liberalism, while in most of East Asia
nations embrace the concept of state intervention (Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998:
323). Beeson and Jayasuriya (1998: 330) concluded that the lack of congruence within
the Asia-Pacific region helps explain the ambiguous and contradictory discourse
that accompanies APEC’ s reform agenda. The notion of “open
regionalism”(Drysdale, Elek and Soessaatro 1998: 104-108), which encourages
unilateral liberalization and an extension of APEC’s benefits to other nations
on either a conditional or an unconditional basis, is designed to accommodate
the interests of both the East Asians and the US. Regarding to non-discrimination principle of
APEC and the difference within APEC between the East and the West, Elek (1995)
suggested that APEC must avoid a conventional discriminatory free trade area
because the substantial elimination of trade barriers through the negotiation
of a free trade area within a period of time would be divisive and delay the
process of liberalization it was supposed to promote. Drysdale, Elek and
Soesastro (1998: 107) proceeded that it would corrode the objective of
community building and lead to the exclusion of major players inside the region
as well as outside.
The initiative of APEC’ s
principles has taken into account the nature structure of APEC since the
beginning. The conformity between the principles and the nature structure of
APEC shares the elements of APEC’ s effectiveness.
Market driven integration of
Asia-Pacific economic and unilateral liberalization
One of unintentional activities
that helps APEC stimulate the promoting of regional economic cooperation and
supporting of the WTO is the market-driven integration of Asia-Pacific
economies across political boundaries, which create even larger zones of
integrated production for global markets. The most visible examples of this
trend are the increasingly intertwined economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and
southern China and the “growth triangle” that links Singapore to neighboring
parts of the Indonesian and Malaysian economies. Other less visible “production
zones” are also evolving, driven by region-wide investment from Northeast Asia.
These developments are fully consistent with the trend toward globalization of
production and investment (Drysdale and Elek 1997: 40-41 and Lloyd 1996: 31).
ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) has demonstrated the patient confidence and consensus building
can breed successful cooperation among diverse members. The ASEAN
post-ministerial conferences are a productive forum involving most of APEC’ s
original 12 participants (Drysdale and Elek: 41). An important feature of ASEAN
is that its strength is based on building confident economic relations with the
rest of the World, not on integration focused on intra-ASEAN trade (Drysdale
and Elek: 68 footnote3). ASEAN countries have generally adopted fairly liberal
trade regimes. The level of protection in these countries has been relatively
low by developing standard (Ariff 1997:84).
In the 1996 Manila Action Plan
for APEC, ASEAN governments confirmed that, as well as liberalizing trade
within AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), they will also continue to lower tariffs
unilaterally against all trading partners. Some of them, including Indonesia
and the Philippines, have indicated that they will extend the liberalization
committed with AFTA to all members of the WTO (Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro
1998: 121). Ariff (1997: 85) concluded that AFTA exercise is consistent and
compatible with the globalist approach.
Also, both Australia and New
Zealand have lower trade barriers against the rest of the world while
eliminating barriers to bilateral trade (Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro 1998:
121). Although NAFTA are not expected to extend the liberalization within
preferential trading arrangement to other countries, in the long run NAFTA are
committed to eliminate border barriers to trade and investment in the Asia
Pacific (Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro 1998: 121). According to Bora (1996:
180), there was an announcement in Indonesia in 1994 that a Free Trade Area of
the Americas was to be formed by 2005.
With reference to GATT’s
statistics, there are countries in APEC that have undertaken unilateral
reduction in protection (Lloyd 1996: 30, 38) such as Japan, South Korea, China,
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New
Zealand. Many of the reductions in Asian countries have been substantial.
APEC’ s long-time experience
concept
APEC started in November 1989 but
the concept behind APEC was long before (Funabashi 1995, Soesastro 1994, Woods
1993, Drysdale 1988). As Drysdale and Elek (1997:39) pointed out, the region’s
strong commitment has provided the intellectual formation for every major
initiative for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region for more than
thirty years, from the formation of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)
and the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) series, through the
formation of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the APEC
process. The essential idea was that the complementarily between the advanced
industrial economies and the developing economies of the region meant that
there were large gains to be secured through increased trade (MacIntyre 1997:
226). PECC brought together tripartite teams of academic economists, business
people and government officials (participating in an unofficial capacity) from
twenty countries around the Pacific in which representatives of both PAFTAD and
PBEC were included. PECC was, in effect, the forerunner to APEC. The key change
that came with the launching of APEC was the agreement among participating
countries to elevate regional economic cooperation to a fully fledged and
exclusively intergovernmental institution. PECC continue to formation as an
important source of ideas for APEC, but the creation of APEC as an institute
bringing government ministers and now heads of state together was indicative of
a desire for greater policy action (MacIntyre 1997:227) and greater
effectiveness of APEC.
Serious coordination, step-by-step
development, and flexibility
From the beginning in 1989 to
1998 APEC has shown its step by step development, and serious and flexibility
to the current political-economic situation in the Asia-Pacific region. These
factors have contributed to the effectiveness of APEC.
The meeting Canberra in 1989 at
the time of uncertainty in Uruguay Round and at the time of East Asia economic
prosperity agreed on the basic principles which would guide APEC, focused on
economic issues to advance common interests and foster constructive
interdependence by encouraging the flow of goods, services, capital and
technology. The establishment of several work projects had shown a significant
development in APEC as it promoted the initiation of regional networks among
various government agencies. The meeting in Singapore issued a declaration underlining
their commitment to the Uruguay Round as a demonstration of APEC’ s support for
a strong, open multilateral system. The meeting in Soul in 1991 stated that
APEC’ s mode of operation (including exchange of information and consultation
on relevant economic policies; development of strategies to reduce impediments
to trade and investment; and promotion of economic and technical cooperation)
is based on mutual benefit, a commitment to open dialogue and consensus
building and cooperation through consultation and exchange of view. At that
time it was the first time that the three Chinas were admitted as members-
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In Bangkok in 1992, the meeting agreed to set up
permanent international secretariat located in Singapore (APECSEC 1999a). In
Seattle in 1993 it was the beginning of the highest level of government’ s
meeting of APEC. In this meeting, sample of initiatives included the convening
of meeting of APEC finance ministers, of APEC ministers involved with small and
medium-size business enterprises, the establishment of a Pacific Business Forum
(now the Asia Pacific Business Advisory Council (APBAC)) and the development of
a non-binding code of principles covering investment issues (APECSEC 1999b).
A sign of seriousness in
Indonesia in 1994 is the setting of goal of free and open trade and investment
in the region by no later than 2010 for industrialized economies, and no later
than 2020 for developing economies (APECSEC 1999c). The meeting in Japan, the
Philippines and Canada in 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively shown a step by step
development following the meeting in 1994 by producing an Action Agenda forcing
APEC process to be on track, indicating the elimination of all border barriers
to trade and investment and the reduction of all other impediments to
international economic transactions. Both individual and collective action
plans make APEC’ s development in promoting regional economic cooperation and
supporting the WTO more substantial (APECSEC 1999d).
In term of flexibility here, it is not
only regarding APEC’ s flexible approach that makes it possible for Asia
Pacific governments to set their own priorities and schedules for
liberalization (Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro 1998: 119) but also regarding
APEC’ s flexible approach that makes it coincide with the current
political-economic situation in the Asia-Pacific region. In Malaysia in 1998
APEC showed its flexibility by preoccupying its discussion topic into the
financial crisis (APECSEC 1999e).
In conclusion, APEC is not just a tentative annual meeting of regional
foreign ministers; there are regular meeting, various senior officials meeting,
more than a dozen “working groups” dealing with different sectoral issue (such
as Trade and Investment Data group, Trade Promotion group, Human Resource
Development group, Energy Cooperation group, Tourism group, Investment and
Industrial Science and Technology group, etc.), a small secretariat, a private
sector advisory organization (the APEC Business Advisory Council), and
independent research capabilities through designated APEC studies centers in
universities around the region (MacIntyre 1997: 229)
Factors that make APEC not
effective
Differences in concept of thought
between the East and the West
Around the time of the fifth
annual meeting of the foreign and trade ministers of the APEC forum, held in
Seattle in November 1993 the US seemed to put forward an agenda for institution
building (Watanabe 1995: 192): the establishment of decision-making mechanisms
that would make possible binding international agreements among APEC members
addressing economic issues (notably trade and investment). The US’ s initiative
was given a cool reception, however, by an Asian contingent wary of hastily
institutionalizing APEC, which had originally been formed as a loose
consultative forum (Watanabe: 192). Most of the members have shied away from
talk of rapid institutionalization and shown a marked preference for a
process-oriented rather than a result-oriented approach to regional
cooperation. This paper is not to argue that APEC should or should not forward
itself to the process of institutionalization. The point here is that the
different thought about APEC may lead to the difficulty in making consensus in
fulfilling the APEC’ s aims or, in other words, lead to ineffectiveness of
APEC. As MacIntyre (1997: 227-8) went on further that the ASEAN states were –
and, as will be seen, in some respects remain – ambivalent about the creation
of APEC. One of their worry was that APEC would be dominated by the West,
especially the US (Snape 1996: 59). However, because ASEAN was the only
relevant and coherent subregional association in the Pacific, South-East Asia
enjoyed an enhanced bargaining position in the early years of APEC’ s
existence. For example, it was clear at the outset that unless the ASEAN states
collectively were satisfied with the proposed framework for APEC, it could not
proceed because of their potential to impose a bloc vote veto. Southeast Asian concerns to guard against the
possibility of APEC becoming a forceful and strictly rules-based organization
dominated by the advanced industrial economies were strongly reflected in the
original agreement reached in Canberra in 1989, and were codified shortly after
in early 1990 with the adoption of a formal ASEAN policy document (MacIntyre
1997: 230). Moreover, in a direct sign of guarding against the US, in December
1990 the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, floated a proposal for
an alternative regional organization for Asian only: an East Asian Economic
Group (EAEG). In the context of the apparent slide towards protectionism and
defensive regionalism in Europe and the Americas at the time, this move was
generally interpreted as an alarming challenge by the Western countries of the
region and encouraged images of a discriminatory Asian trading bloc (MacIntyre
1997: 230).
Paradox of its own concept
The initiate concept of APEC from
the beginning do not strictly put APEC into a forceful regional institution.
Two of the core organizing principles of APEC were the notions of “open
regionalism” and governance by voluntary and consensus basis. In essence, open
regionalism refers to a pattern of regional economic cooperation which is open
to all comers and does not discriminate against other countries. APEC stands in
contrast to the organizing principles of the other major frameworks for
international economic cooperation (such as EU, NAFTA). APEC operates on a
voluntary and consensual basic, rather than in a formalized manner governed by
binding ruling. The logic behind the consensus principle is to guard against
the possibility of unwanted commitments being forced upon members (especially
ASEAN countries and the other East Asian members) (MacIntyre: 236).
MacIntype (1997:236) cited a
number of writers (Aggarwal 1994; Kahler 1994; Fane 1995; Ravenhill 1995) who
had argued that these organizing principles are politically naÃŊve and
effectively preclude the possibility of
APEC making significant headway with economic policy coordination. They
argued that without specific reciprocity requirements the incentives for
individual countries to free ride on the back of the efforts of those who
volunteer to liberalize first will be such as to undermine the whole process of
cooperation. Countries which do liberalise will be unwilling to move further if
their concessions are not reciprocated. This problem of incentives for
cooperation is further compounded by the fact that APEC rules extend benefits
not just to APEC countries, but to any country at all (MacIntyre: 236).
Furthermore, if it is true that participants in Asia Pacific has gone
liberalization unilaterally, then it is not necessary for APEC to exist (Fane
1995 and Ravenhill 1995).
More examples of paradox of APEC’
s own concept could be drawn here.
-If APEC’ s
principle is voluntary, why APEC set the deadline for its trade liberalization.
Since APEC’ s flexible approach makes it possible for Asia Pacific governments
to set their own priorities and schedules for liberalization, so why there are
such deadline.
-The
principle of comprehensiveness combined with the principle of flexibility
confirm that while members can determine the sequence of policy adjustments,
“sensitive” sectors and policy issues will not be excluded from the agreed
target dates for free and open trade and investment (Drysdale, Elek and
Soesastro: 111). In this sense, the conflict is that “comprehensive” is a
matter of compulsory while “flexibility” is a matter of voluntary.
Uncertainty of the cooperation
Uncertainty of the cooperation
among APEC members could be expected. Entrenched attitudes to trade
negotiations and resentment against the small fraction of the potential benefits
which would accrue to non-participants might preclude APEC- wide
non-discriminatory initiatives --this is the so-called free-rider problem. Even
subregional agreements within APEC may be even harder to achieve, due to the
greater share of potential gains accruing to free-riders (Elek 1994: 215).
To some academists, they have
seen a lack of institutional development as indicating limited progress at best
in regional economic cooperation. For an effective cooperation, they must be
based upon formal rules, international treaties and implementing or enforcing
organization. To this logic, it is uncertain for effectiveness of APEC –
cooperation that are based on informal contractual agreements – to fulfill its
aims.
Conclusion
The likely effectiveness of APEC
cannot be drawn in a clear line. In static term or in the short run, there is
no clear answer that yes, APEC is effective; or no, APEC is not effective.
Therefore, it is appropriate to implant the level or degree of APEC’ s
effectiveness as shown in this paper’ s conceptual framework. The answer to the
effectiveness also depends must on how one interprets the
outcome/performance/meaning/idea concerning APEC. Harris (1993: 271) put it
this way: the benefits of economic cooperation are obviously greater if
cooperation is interpreted widely rather than narrowly. Those seeking increased
economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region would certainly argue against a
narrow interpretation.
In general, it is difficult to
set criteria in judging the effectiveness of an international organization or
regional economic agreement. Actually, we do not know which regional economic
agreement is the best one that is fit to all kind of regional arrangements.
Each regional economic agreement has its own history, nature and experience. If
we said that the EU is the best regional arrangement and should be set as
criteria for other regional arrangements, APEC would never be effective. APEC
is unique in its own nature. Its objective is not only to promote regional
economic cooperation but also to support the world multilateral order. If APEC’
s objective were only to promote regional economic cooperation, it would be, to
some extent, close to the EU or NAFTA. If APEC’ s objective were only to
support the WTO, it would be regarded as WTO’ s subsidiary.
By considering both factors that
probably make APEC effective and not effective, APEC in dynamic term or in the
long run would be able to share the high level of APEC’ s effectiveness in
promoting regional economic cooperation and supporting the WTO. In the long
run, factors that make APEC not effective would be faded for following reasons:
1.In the
long run, policy makers in both the West and the East would realize that less formal
methods of collective action, based on conventions and collective
understandings of the rules of conduct, may be workable as guides to
international cooperation. Even the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) or WTO, although a formal contractual arrangement, depends upon such
informal understandings and guidelines (Harris, 272).
2.Given the
growing intra-regional trade and investment links, the need for further
stimulation of closer economic cooperation may seem redundant. Yet because
countries in the region are becoming economically integrated in production as
well as trade, policies being developed nationally for each economy in the
region increasingly impinge upon other economies in the region. Activities in
one regional country are, therefore, becoming more sensitive to developments
elsewhere in the regions. Globally much of the underpinning of economic
interaction, and the channels of communication which provide and diffuse the
information flows on which market transaction depend, reflect extensive
networks of business, professional and scientific contacts. In the Asia Pacific
region, as elsewhere, professional, business or scientific bodies with
regional-wide groups or subgroups contribute to greater understanding among the
countries of the region, or help expand information flows (Harris, 276). In
short, information gap between the West and the East will be diminished.
3.Because
in the Asia-Pacific region there are wide differences in political systems,
institution and economic systems, there remains a limited region-wide
congruence of economic objectives or understanding. Nevertheless, as with trade
policy, experience has indicated that over time some convergence of
expectations and understandings can be achieved to facilitate common interpretations
of actions and, increasingly, their future coordination. Considerable time will
be required, however, before the common acceptance of objectives and practices
experienced in Europe or North America is achieved (Harris, 284).
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